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O P I N I O N 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
Congress passed the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act 
of 2000 (“CAFRA”), Pub. L. No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202, as a 
“react[ion] to public outcry over the government’s too-
zealous pursuit of civil and criminal forfeiture” and as an 
“effort to deter government overreaching.”  United States v. 
Khan, 497 F.3d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 2007).1  To that end, 
Congress crafted a statutory scheme that requires the 
Government, if it has seized property that someone else 
purports to own, to file a complaint for judicial forfeiture 
within 90 days of receipt of a claim (known as a “seized asset 
claim”) or else to return the property.  18 U.S.C. 
§ 983(a)(3)(A).  CAFRA also imposes on the Government a 
heightened burden of proof to establish its right to the 
property in such proceedings.  United States v. Sum of 
$185,336.07 U.S. Currency, 731 F.3d 189, 196 (2d Cir. 
2013).   
 
Here, the Government failed to follow CAFRA’s 
procedure, which requires it to file a complaint for judicial 
forfeiture within 90 days of the filing of a seized asset claim.  
Accordingly, we will reverse the portion of the District 
                                              
1 See also H.R. Rep. No. 106-192, at 10 (1999) (“Civil asset 
forfeiture does not just impact civil liberties and property 
rights.  It can work at total cross purposes with the few 
professed public policy goals of the federal government.”).   
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Court’s July 29, 2009 order denying the appellants’ cross-
motion for partial summary judgment concerning the 
applicability of CAFRA.  We will vacate all orders at issue on 
appeal that postdate the July 29, 2009 order, including the 
jury verdict and the District Court’s order entering judgment.  
Further, we will remand for the District Court and instruct it 
to grant the appellants the relief required by this Opinion. 
 
I.  Background 
The ownership of the property in question and how the 
appellants obtained possession of it are hotly disputed, but the 
facts relevant to the disposition of this appeal are not.  The 
property consists of ten coins that were minted in 1933.  Each 
coin is a double eagle, which is a $20 gold coin.  The 1933 
double eagle is alleged to be “the most valuable ounce of gold 
in the world” and “America’s most beautiful coin.”  (J.A. 
609.)  There were 445,500 double eagles minted in 1933; 
however, those coins were generally not released into 
circulation.  Instead, in an effort to halt the banking crisis 
during the Great Depression, President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
issued an executive order in 1933 removing gold coins from 
circulation.  See Exec. Order No. 6102 (Apr. 5, 1933).2  The 
U.S. Mint (“Mint”) was forbidden from releasing any more 
gold coins, and, over the next few years, began melting the 
coins into gold bricks.  Nonetheless, a number of 1933 double 
                                              
2 Executive Order 6102 allowed people to continue to possess 
“[g]old coin and gold certificates in an amount not exceeding 
in the aggregate $100 belonging to any one person,” as well 
as “gold coins having a recognized special value to collectors 
of rare and unusual coins.”  Exec. Order No. 6102, at § 2(b) 
(Apr. 5, 1933). 
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eagles left the Mint; some were unlawfully smuggled out and 
at least two left the Mint lawfully.   
 
One 1933 double eagle was sold to King Farouk of 
Egypt, a coin collector, in 1944.  This coin had been 
unlawfully smuggled out of the Mint, but the Government 
“had improvidently issued an export license,” which muddied 
the issue of who rightfully possessed the coin.  (J.A. 28.)  In 
1995, an English coin dealer, Stephen Fenton, purchased that 
coin for approximately $200,000.  Fenton then contacted a 
coin dealer in the United States, who subsequently became a 
confidential informant for the U.S. Secret Service (“Secret 
Service”).  The confidential informant convinced Fenton to 
bring the coin to the United States in 1996.  The Secret 
Service seized the coin from Fenton in New York City, and 
litigation ensued.  The Government ultimately settled with 
Fenton, agreeing to sell the coin at auction and divide the 
proceeds equally.  The Fenton coin was auctioned in 2002 for 
nearly $7.6 million.  
 
The appellants in this case are Joan Langbord and her 
sons, Roy and David Langbord (collectively, the 
“Langbords”).  Shortly after the Fenton coin sold at auction, 
Joan Langbord allegedly discovered ten 1933 double eagles 
(the “Double Eagles”) in a safe deposit box originally 
belonging to her deceased father, Israel Switt.  Several 
decades earlier, the Secret Service suspected that Switt, an 
antique dealer in Philadelphia, and George McCann, a former 
Philadelphia Mint cashier, unlawfully smuggled 1933 double 
eagles out of the Philadelphia Mint; however, Switt’s 
involvement in this scheme was never proven. 
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In 2004, the Langbords’ counsel informed the Mint 
about the Double Eagles that the Langbords had discovered.  
The Langbords sought an agreement similar to the Fenton 
coin compromise.  The Mint’s attorneys stated that they 
“would be willing to discuss the matter” and that they were 
“amenable to a discussion” on that topic.  (J.A. 142.)  The 
Langbords, explicitly reserving their rights to the Double 
Eagles, made the coins available to the Government for the 
sole purpose of authentication.  (J.A. 806.)  Shortly thereafter, 
the agencies involved—i.e., the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the 
District of Columbia, the Secret Service, the U.S. Department 
of the Treasury (“Treasury”), and the Mint—met to discuss 
how to proceed.  A memorandum summarizing the meeting 
states that “[a]ll the agencies involved, with the exception of 
the US Mint, are in favor of pursuing forfeiture.”  (J.A. 818.)  
Only the Mint “assert[ed] that the coins are government 
property and should be returned [to the Mint] without the 
need for forfeiture.”  (Id.) 
 
The Double Eagles were authenticated, and the 
Treasury sided with the Mint, deciding not to institute a 
judicial civil forfeiture proceeding.  When the Langbords’ 
counsel requested return of the Double Eagles, the Mint’s 
counsel wrote to him, stating, “[t]he United States Mint has 
no intention of seeking forfeiture of these ten Double Eagles 
because they already are, and always have been, property 
belonging to the United States; this makes forfeiture 
proceedings entirely unnecessary.”  (J.A. 823.)  In response, 
the Langbords’ counsel submitted a “seized asset claim” on 
September 9, 2005, demanding the return of the Double 
Eagles or the institution of a judicial civil forfeiture 
proceeding.  (J.A. 828-35.)  As described below, a seized 
asset claim starts the process whereby the Government must 
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either institute a judicial civil forfeiture proceeding or return 
the seized property.  Nevertheless, in response to the seized 
asset claim, the Mint responded that it was “returning these 
documents . . . without action,” again stating that “[t]here is 
simply no basis for the Government to initiate forfeiture 
proceedings on property to which the United States holds 
title.”3  (J.A. 837.)   
 
In the face of the Government’s refusal, the Langbords 
instituted this civil action in December 2006.  The Langbords 
asserted two claims for violations of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”), a claim for violation of CAFRA, a 
Fifth Amendment claim, a Fourth Amendment claim, a claim 
for mandamus, and two claims under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act (“FTCA”) for replevin and conversion. 
 
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  
On July 29, 2009, the District Court ruled in favor of the 
Government on the CAFRA claim, holding that CAFRA’s 
                                              
3 The Mint’s terse letter also denied that the Government had 
seized the Double Eagles, an assertion which, as described 
below, the District Court correctly rejected.  (See J.A. 837 
(“As you and your client are aware, there has been no seizure 
of any property that is owned by, or that could be claimed to 
be owned by, your client.”); J.A. 838 (“In short, there has 
been no seizure of property; your client voluntarily 
surrendered to the United States property belonging to the 
United States.”).)  This denial starkly contrasts with a 
contemporaneous internal Government memorandum that 
conceded that a seizure had occurred.  (See J.A. 818 (“On 
September 22, 2004, the [Secret Service] seized ten coins 
referred to as ‘1933 Gold Double Eagle Coins’ . . . .”).) 
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90-day deadline in § 983(a)(3) did not apply because it 
applies only to nonjudicial civil forfeitures and no such 
forfeiture had occurred here.  It reasoned that: (1) a “non-
judicial civil forfeiture ‘is commenced when the Government 
sends notice of the forfeiture proceeding to potential 
claimants’”; (2) “the Government never sent [the Langbords] 
such a notice”; and thus (3) “the Government never began an 
administrative forfeiture proceeding4 and therefore the 
requirements of § 983(a) [namely, the 90-day deadline] do 
not apply.”  (J.A. 146 (quoting Stefan D. Cassella, Asset 
Forfeiture Law in the United States 143 (1st ed. 2007) 
[hereinafter Cassella First Edition]).)  The District Court did 
find, however, that the Government had violated the 
Langbords’ Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable 
seizures and their Fifth Amendment due process right by 
taking the Double Eagles contrary to the parties’ agreement.  
It held that the remedy for these constitutional violations was 
for the Government either to return the coins or to institute a 
judicial civil forfeiture proceeding, which is the same result 
that § 983(a)(3) demands, but without the 90-day deadline.  
The District Court granted the Government’s summary 
judgment motion on the APA claims and postponed ruling on 
the FTCA claims. 
 
As ordered by the District Court, the Government 
sought leave to file a judicial civil forfeiture complaint on 
September 28, 2009.  The complaint alleged that the Double 
Eagles were “embezzled, stolen, purloined, knowingly 
converted to private use, or taken from the United States Mint 
in Philadelphia without authority, and [were] concealed and 
                                              
4 As used here, “administrative forfeiture” is synonymous 
with “nonjudicial civil forfeiture.” 
 10 
 
retained with the intent to convert [them] to private use or 
gain” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641.  (J.A. 1178.)  The 
Government’s proposed complaint also included a declaratory 
judgment claim that “the disputed Double Eagles were not 
lawfully removed from the United States Mint and that 
accordingly, as a matter of law, they remain property of the 
United States.”  (J.A. 1180.)   
 
Over the Langbords’ objection, the District Court 
granted leave to file portions of the complaint, including the 
forfeiture claim and the declaratory judgment claim.  It also 
ruled that the Langbords had a right to a jury trial on the 
forfeiture claim but not on the declaratory judgment claim.  A 
jury trial was held on the forfeiture claim, and the jury 
returned a verdict for the Government on July 20, 2011, 
finding that the Double Eagles had been stolen from the Mint.  
As a result of the jury verdict, the District Court entered 
judgment for the Government on its forfeiture claim, as well 
as on the related declaratory judgment claim. 
 
On appeal, the Langbords argue that the District Court 
erred by granting summary judgment for the Government on 
the issue of CAFRA’s 90-day statutory deadline for filing a 
judicial civil forfeiture action.  They also argue that the 
District Court erred by allowing the Government’s 
declaratory judgment claim to proceed and by denying the 
Langbords’ request to have the declaratory judgment claim 
tried by a jury.  In addition, the Langbords appeal the District 
Court’s admission of certain evidence at trial,5 argue that the 
                                              
5 The Langbords persuasively argue that the hearsay-within-
hearsay rule, Fed. R. Evid. 805, does apply to ancient 
documents admitted pursuant to Rule 803(16), contrary to the 
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District Court improperly instructed the jury on criminal 
intent, and urge that the Government cannot seize property as 
a result of an 18 U.S.C. § 641 violation—i.e., stolen 
government property—unless the property was stolen or 
embezzled after 1948 when § 641 was enacted. 
 
II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had jurisdiction over the 
Langbords’ claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 
1346(b)(1), 1356, and 1361 and 5 U.S.C. § 702; it had 
jurisdiction over the Government’s claims pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1345 and 1355(a).  We have jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
We “employ a plenary standard in reviewing orders 
entered on motions for summary judgment, applying the same 
standard as the district court.”  Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. 
Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014).  We review questions 
of law de novo.  United States v. Mallory, 765 F.3d 373, 381-
82 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 
                                                                                                     
District Court’s holding.  Although we do not reach the issue, 
the District Court appears to have been mistaken.  See United 
States v. Hajda, 135 F.3d 439, 444 (7th Cir. 1998) (“These 
documents are more than 20 years old and they were properly 
authenticated, so they are exceptions to the hearsay rule 
admissible under Rule 803(16) of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.  However, this admissibility exception applies only 
to the document itself.  If the document contains more than 
one level of hearsay, an appropriate exception must be found 
for each level.”). 
 12 
 
III.  Discussion 
A.  The CAFRA Violation 
The Government was required either to file a judicial 
civil forfeiture complaint or to return the Double Eagles 
within 90 days of receipt of the Langbords’ seized asset claim 
under 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(3)(A).  Because the Government 
failed to do so, the Langbords are entitled to the return of the 
Double Eagles. 
 
The Government’s position as to why it did not need to 
fulfill its obligation under § 983(a)(3)(A) has morphed over 
time.  When the Government initially returned the Langbords’ 
seized asset claim without action, it claimed that it did not 
need to abide by CAFRA because the property was stolen 
government property.  Now, the Government’s principal 
argument is that it did not need to abide by CAFRA because 
it never sent a notice to the Langbords that it was pursuing 
forfeiture, thereby relieving it of its obligation to institute a 
judicial civil forfeiture proceeding.  Neither of these 
arguments nor any of the Government’s remaining arguments 
have merit. 
 
The Government’s original argument that stolen 
government property falls outside the protections of CAFRA 
is incorrect for a simple reason: Congress has specifically 
enumerated theft or embezzlement of government property as 
one of the crimes to which CAFRA applies.  Congress has 
provided that “[t]he following property is subject to forfeiture 
to the United States: . . . . [a]ny property, real or personal, 
which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to . . . 
any offense constituting ‘specified unlawful activity’ (as 
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defined in section 1956(c)(7) of this title).”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 981(a)(1)(C) (emphasis added).  “[S]pecified unlawful 
activity” includes “an offense under . . . section 641 (relating 
to public money, property, or records).”  Id. § 1956(c)(7)(D).  
Section 641, the very statute alleged in the Government’s 
complaint to have been violated, criminalizes the theft or 
embezzlement “of any record, voucher, money, or thing of 
value of the United States or of any department or agency 
thereof.”  Id. § 641 (emphasis added).  The Government 
claims that the Double Eagles are government property—i.e., 
things of value of the United States.  (J.A. 1178.)  Clearly, 
CAFRA applies when the underlying property is stolen 
government property. 
 
The Government’s original argument also appears to 
have been based on the notion that the Langbords voluntarily 
surrendered the Double Eagles to the Government.  However, 
on summary judgment, the District Court concluded that the 
Government’s seizure of the coins was unconstitutional, and 
the Government has not cross-appealed this ruling.6  The 
Langbords turned the Double Eagles over to the Government 
for the sole purpose of authenticating them, and they 
“specifically reserve[d] all rights and remedies with respect to 
the Coins.”  (J.A. 806.)  As the District Court found, the 
Langbords’ “letter communicated that [they] did not intend 
the transfer to be an unconditional, permanent surrender,” and 
“once [they] became aware that the Government intended to 
                                              
6 Regardless of whether the Government could have taken an 
interlocutory appeal of the District Court’s July 29, 2009 
summary judgment order, the Government could have cross-
appealed at the conclusion of the case, after the jury trial.  It 
did not. 
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keep the coins permanently, they promptly requested their 
return.”  (J.A. 150.)  
 
The Government’s seizure of property—even under a 
theory that the property ultimately belongs to the 
Government—can violate the Fourth and Fifth Amendment.  
See Soldal v. Cook Cnty., Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992) (“A 
‘seizure’ of property, we have explained, occurs when ‘there 
is some meaningful interference with an individual’s 
possessory interests in that property.’” (quoting United States 
v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)); see also Lesher v. 
Reed, 12 F.3d 148, 150 (8th Cir. 1994) (“The Leshers’ 
constitutional right against unreasonable seizures is not 
vitiated merely because the [government] believed the dog 
belonged to the [Little Rock Police Department].”).  Here, the 
Langbords had a possessory right that they preserved in 
writing when they turned the Double Eagles over for 
authentication.  Even if the Double Eagles ultimately were 
stolen government property, the Government’s seizure of 
them was unconstitutional, as the District Court determined. 
 
With this original line of argument rejected, we turn to 
the Government’s main assertion on appeal—namely, that all 
it needs to do to avoid CAFRA’s protections is to refrain from 
sending notice that it is commencing a forfeiture proceeding.  
As a corollary, the Government argues that it can avoid 
CAFRA by unequivocally stating in its communication with 
the people whose property was seized that it is not seeking 
forfeiture.  If the Government seizes property claimed by 
someone else—whether it be money, a car, or even a house—
the Government argues it can avoid the protections Congress 
sought to put in place simply by saying, “we are not seeking 
forfeiture.”   
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The Langbords are correct in urging that we reject 
these arguments.  The Government was required either to 
return their property or to institute a judicial civil forfeiture 
proceeding within 90 days of the Langbords’ submission of a 
seized asset claim.  See 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(3)(A) (“Not later 
than 90 days after a claim has been filed, the Government 
shall file a complaint for forfeiture . . . or return the property 
. . . .”).  This is what CAFRA envisions: the Government 
cannot unilaterally ignore a seized asset claim.  Instead, the 
Government must either return the seized property or file a 
complaint in court to seek forfeiture of the seized property 
within 90 days of receipt of the seized asset claim.  Our 
dissenting colleague takes issue with this proposition, urging 
that, although the Government was required to have followed 
the 90-day deadline in § 983(a)(3), its failure to do so does 
not require the Government to return the Double Eagles to the 
Langbords.  This is a novel argument, never posited by the 
Government, and, as we discuss below, not supported by any 
relevant case authority.7  Moreover, it rewrites the statute.  
 
Section 983(a) contains three independent subparts: in 
(a)(1) it imposes a 60-day timeline for the Government to 
send written notice of forfeiture in certain cases; in (a)(2) it 
creates a mechanism by which a person claiming seized 
                                              
7 We note, further, that of the approximately thirty cases cited 
in Parts I and II of the dissent, only one was ever referred to 
in any of the briefing—cited in a footnote in the 
Government’s Brief for an unrelated issue.  As we discuss 
below, the jurisprudence the dissent cites is off-point, dealing 
with a different provision of CAFRA, § 983(a)(1), and even 
entirely different statutes.  See infra note 19.   
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property can file a seized asset claim, whether or not the 
Government has sent or is required to send notice; and in 
(a)(3) it imposes a 90-day timeline, after a seized asset claim 
has been filed, for the Government to respond either by 
returning the property or by filing a complaint in court for 
judicial forfeiture.   
 
The District Court incorrectly reasoned that the seized 
asset claim provision, § 983(a)(2), and the 90-day provision, 
§ 983(a)(3), are activated only if written notice is sent under 
§ 983(a)(1).  This is wrong.  The District Court combined 
§ 983(a)(1) with (a)(2) and (a)(3) and held that, in any 
forfeiture situation in which the Government does not send 
notice under § 983(a)(1), no one is able to file a seized asset 
claim pursuant to § 983(a)(2).  But a careful reading of the 
statutory provisions demonstrates that this is not the case: 
 
(1)(A)(i) Except as provided in clauses (ii) 
through (v), in any nonjudicial civil forfeiture 
proceeding under a civil forfeiture statute, with 
respect to which the Government is required to 
send written notice to interested parties, such 
notice shall be sent in a manner to achieve 
proper notice as soon as practicable, and in no 
case more than 60 days after the date of the 
seizure. . . . 
(2)(A) Any person claiming property seized in a 
nonjudicial civil forfeiture proceeding under a 
civil forfeiture statute may file a claim with the 
appropriate official after the seizure. . . . 
(3)(A) Not later than 90 days after a claim has 
been filed, the Government shall file a 
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complaint for forfeiture . . . or return the 
property pending the filing of a complaint . . . . 
(3)(B) If the Government does not—(i) file a 
complaint for forfeiture or return the property, 
in accordance with subparagraph [(3)](A) . . . 
the Government shall promptly release the 
property pursuant to regulations promulgated by 
the Attorney General, and may not take any 
further action to effect the civil forfeiture of 
such property in connection with the underlying 
offense.8 
 
18 U.S.C. § 983(a) (emphasis added).   
Section 983(a)(1)(A) provides for the manner and 
timing of notice that the Government must use in those 
“nonjudicial civil forfeiture proceeding[s] . . . with respect to 
which the Government is required to send written notice.”  Id. 
§ 983(a)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added).  This provision 
recognizes that another law—separate from CAFRA—
provides that notice must be sent in some, but not all, 
                                              
8 The dissent points to the phrase, “return the property 
pending the filing of a complaint,” in § 983(a)(3)(A), as 
creating ambiguity as to the Government’s obligations.  (See 
Diss. Op. at 3.)  However, there is no question that the 
Government did not return the Double Eagles pending the 
filing of a complaint.  Therefore, the Government did not 
comply with § 983(a)(3)(A), which then requires that “the 
Government shall promptly release the property . . . and may 
not take any further action to effect the civil forfeiture of such 
property in connection with the underlying offense.”  18 
U.S.C. § 983(a)(3)(B). 
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nonjudicial civil forfeiture proceedings.  See 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1607(a).9  Section 1607(a) does not speak to the manner or 
timing of the notice; that is what § 983(a)(1) does.  The 
Government errs in urging that, when notice of forfeiture is 
either not required or not given within 60 days of a seizure 
under § 983(a)(1), that insulates the Government from its 
obligation under § 983(a)(3) to act within 90 days of 
receiving a seized asset claim.  Instead, § 983(a)(2) and (a)(3) 
act independently from § 983(a)(1): whether notice has been 
filed has nothing to do with the Government’s duty to 
respond to a seized asset claim.  Therefore, § 983(a)(1) is 
irrelevant to the analysis that we must conduct under 
§ 983(a)(2) and (a)(3). 
 
The text of § 983(a)(3) provides that, “[n]ot later than 
90 days after a claim has been filed, the Government shall 
file a complaint for forfeiture . . . or return the property.”  18 
                                              
9 Notice is required in the following situations: 
(1) the value of such seized vessel, vehicle, 
aircraft, merchandise, or baggage does not 
exceed $ 500,000; 
(2) such seized merchandise is merchandise the 
importation of which is prohibited; 
(3) such seized vessel, vehicle, or aircraft was 
used to import, export, transport, or store 
any controlled substance or listed chemical; 
or 
(4) such seized merchandise is any monetary 
instrument within the meaning of section 
5312(a)(3) of title 31 of the United States 
Code; . . . . 
19 U.S.C. § 1607(a). 
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U.S.C. § 983(a)(3)(A) (emphasis added).  And the 
requirements for filing a claim are laid out in § 983(a)(2), not 
§ 983(a)(1).  “Any person claiming property seized in a 
nonjudicial civil forfeiture proceeding under a civil forfeiture 
statute may file a claim with the appropriate official after the 
seizure.”  Id. § 983(a)(2)(A) (emphasis added).  Here, the 
Government’s seizure of the property is rightfully considered 
a nonjudicial civil forfeiture proceeding.  See Stefan D. 
Cassella, Asset Forfeiture Law in the United States 10 (2d ed. 
2013) [hereinafter Cassella Second Edition] (“Basically, an 
administrative forfeiture begins when a federal law 
enforcement agency with statutory authority in a given area 
(e.g., DEA in a drug case, FBI in a fraud case, ATF in a 
firearms case) seizes property discovered in the course of an 
investigation.”).10  In other words, it is when the agency 
“seizes property” that the “administrative forfeiture begins.”  
Id.  Because a nonjudicial civil forfeiture proceeding occurred 
when the Government seized the coins, the Langbords had the 
right to submit a seized asset claim under § 983(a)(2), and, 
when they did, they triggered the Government’s obligation 
under § 983(a)(3) to bring a judicial civil forfeiture 
proceeding or to return the property within 90 days. 
 
The Government’s insistence that “[t]he statute says 
that an administrative forfeiture proceeding is initiated by the 
government providing notice of the seizure” is baffling.  (Oral 
                                              
10 While most forfeitures result from the Government’s 
seizure of property derived from illegal activity, CAFRA 
covers stolen government property in the hands of third 
parties, as was explained above.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 981(a)(1)(C) (cross-referencing 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7), 
which cross-references 18 U.S.C. § 641). 
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Arg. Tr. 52:7-9, Nov. 19, 2014.)  But the District Court 
agreed.  Quoting from a section of a treatise that does not 
discuss the applicability of § 983(a)(3), the District Court 
held that “[a] non-judicial civil forfeiture proceeding ‘is 
commenced when the Government sends notice of the 
forfeiture proceeding to potential claimants.’”  (J.A. 146 
(quoting Cassella First Edition, supra, at 143).)  However, as 
the language of § 983(a)(1)(A)(i) makes clear, only in some 
nonjudicial civil forfeiture proceedings under a civil forfeiture 
statute11 is the Government required to send written notice.  
Otherwise, the subsection would not need to include the 
phrase, “in any nonjudicial civil forfeiture proceeding under a 
civil forfeiture statute, with respect to which the Government 
is required to send written notice to interested parties.”  18 
U.S.C. § 983(a)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added).  It cannot be that 
a case where no notice of forfeiture is required is nonetheless 
beholden to the Government’s notice as starting the 
administrative process.  The frivolity of the Government’s 
position is demonstrated by the fact that it would afford the 
Government total discretion to avoid CAFRA altogether by 
unilaterally deciding not to notify the putative owner of the 
seizure. 
 
Further proof of why the Government is incorrect 
appears in § 983(e)(1), which provides that “[a]ny person 
                                              
11 There is no dispute that the Government acted “under a 
civil forfeiture statute.”  The definition of “civil forfeiture 
statute” is “any provision of Federal law providing for the 
forfeiture of property other than as a sentence imposed upon 
conviction of a criminal offense.”  18 U.S.C. § 983(i)(1).  
There are five enumerated exceptions, none of which applies 
here.  See id. § 983(i)(2). 
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entitled to written notice in any nonjudicial civil forfeiture 
proceeding under a civil forfeiture statute who does not 
receive such notice may file a motion to set aside a 
declaration of forfeiture with respect to that person’s interest 
in the property.”  Id. § 983(e)(1) (emphasis added).  Section 
983(e)(1) is triggered only when there is a “nonjudicial civil 
forfeiture proceeding” in which the Government has not sent 
notice of its intent to pursue forfeiture.  But if such a 
proceeding can be commenced only when the Government 
has sent notice of its intent, then the statute makes no sense.  
In other words, if a nonjudicial civil forfeiture proceeding 
commences only when the Government sends notice that it is 
instituting such a proceeding, then § 983(e)(1), which 
provides a remedy in any nonjudicial civil forfeiture 
proceeding in which the Government was required but failed 
to give notice of its intent to pursue forfeiture, would be 
nonsensical.  Therefore, it cannot be the case that a 
nonjudicial civil forfeiture proceeding is initiated only when 
the Government sends notice that it intends to commence 
such a proceeding.12  Section 983(a)(1) does not initiate a 
                                              
12 To assert that a nonjudicial civil forfeiture proceeding 
occurs only when the Government sends notice, the 
Government relies upon cases interpreting the 60-day notice 
requirement of § 983(a)(1), which do not address the 
applicability of the 90-day requirement in § 983(a)(3).  See, 
e.g., United States v. Approximately $1,305,105 in Assorted 
Silver Bars & Gold & Silver Coins, No. 12-C-7505, 2013 WL 
453195, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 2013), rev’d, No. 13-1452 
(7th Cir. July 22, 2013); United States v. Assets Described in 
“Attachment A”, No. 6:09-cv-1852, 2010 WL 1893327, at *6 
(M.D. Fla. May 11, 2010); United States v. $147,900, No. 
1:06-cv-197, 2009 WL 903356, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 
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nonjudicial civil forfeiture proceeding; rather, it provides the 
manner of giving notice when the provisions requiring notice 
apply.   
 
Instead, a “nonjudicial civil forfeiture proceeding” 
commences when the Government has seized property.  
Cassella Second Edition, supra, at 10.  When the Government 
has seized property, then the person from whom the property 
was seized has the right to file a seized asset claim pursuant 
to § 983(a)(2)(A), thereby triggering the 90-day deadline in 
§ 983(a)(3)(A).  If the Government has not seized property, 
then it has no obligation to respond to a seized asset claim.  
Thus, the horrors described by the Government at oral 
argument—e.g., pro se prisoners filing seized asset claims for 
jailhouse televisions—is of no concern here.  Because no 
seizure occurred in those situations, the Government would 
not have to file a judicial forfeiture action, even if someone 
files a seized asset claim.  It is only when a seizure occurs 
that there is a “nonjudicial civil forfeiture proceeding” and 
thus the Government must respond.13  Here, the Government 
                                                                                                     
2009), vacated in part, 450 F. App’x 261 (4th Cir. 2011); 
DWB Holding Co. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 
1272 (M.D. Fla. 2009).  
13 (See Oral Arg. Tr. 59:4-15 (“The other problem with this 
notion that somebody can create their own forfeiture 
proceeding by filing a seized asset claim is we would be 
bombarded by litigation. . . . All the prisoners who say, [y]ou 
know, that TV set on the wall is mine, I declare it.  Here’s a 
seized asset claim.  You have 90 days to file a judicial 
forfeiture against me, when the government never initiated 
any forfeiture at all because the TV set [was never theirs]—
we can go on and on with examples.”).)  This example is off-
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unquestionably committed a seizure (and an unconstitutional 
one at that), so it was required to respond to the Langbords’ 
seized asset claim, either by filing a judicial complaint within 
90 days or by returning the property.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 983(a)(3)(A).  Instead, the Government forced the 
Langbords to commence this decade-long ordeal for the 
return of the Double Eagles. 
 
The Government’s remaining arguments as to why the 
90-day deadline should not apply also lack merit.14  These 
                                                                                                     
topic because the Government did not seize the TV set, and, 
therefore, no nonjudicial civil forfeiture proceeding has 
occurred.  Accordingly, the Government would have no 
obligation to respond to the seized asset claim.   
14 The Government has not argued that the Langbords waived 
their right to CAFRA’s 90-day deadline by consenting to the 
forfeiture proceeding, which the District Court ordered as a 
remedy for the Government’s unconstitutional seizure of the 
Double Eagles.  Accordingly, the Government has waived 
any potential waiver argument.  See Freeman v. Pittsburgh 
Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 250 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[A] 
party can waive a waiver argument by not making the 
argument below or in its briefs.”).  Regardless, the Langbords 
have clearly and repeatedly raised the argument that the 
Government violated the 90-day deadline in § 983(a)(3).  
(See, e.g., J.A. 628, 775-78.)  We note that this is why there 
was no “agreement of the parties” as to the Government’s late 
filing of the forfeiture complaint.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 983(a)(3)(A) (“Not later than 90 days after a claim has been 
filed, the Government shall file a complaint for forfeiture . . . , 
except that a court in the district in which the complaint will 
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arguments are: (1) the value of the Double Eagles prevented 
them from being subject to CAFRA; (2) the Mint was not 
authorized to bring a forfeiture action; and (3) 
§ 983(a)(3)(A)’s “good cause” exception applies. 
 
First, the Government’s argument that the Double 
Eagles were not subject to forfeiture because their value 
exceeded $500,000 is unavailing.  This argument relies on 19 
U.S.C. § 1607(a), which states only that “the appropriate 
customs officer shall cause a notice of the seizure of such 
articles and the intention to forfeit . . . to be published for at 
least three successive weeks in such manner as the Secretary 
of the Treasury may direct.”  19 U.S.C. § 1607(a).  One of the 
instances in which notice is not required is when the value of 
the property exceeds $500,000.  Id. § 1607(a)(1).  Because 
the Government assumes that notice is required to commence 
a forfeiture proceeding and because § 1607(a) demonstrates 
that no notice was required in this case, as the Double Eagles’ 
value allegedly exceeds $500,000, the Government argues 
that no forfeiture has occurred here.  This argument fails.  
Section 1607(a) is relevant to determining whether the 
Government was obligated to provide notice of forfeiture 
within 60 days pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(1), but it does 
not relieve the Government of its 90-day deadline in 
§ 983(a)(3).  Notice is not a prerequisite for persons to file a 
seized asset claim and trigger the 90-day deadline in 
§ 983(a)(3).   
 
Second, the Government’s argument that its conduct 
did not amount to a nonjudicial civil forfeiture since the Mint 
                                                                                                     
be filed may extend the period for filing . . . upon agreement 
of the parties.”). 
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was not authorized to conduct a forfeiture under 31 U.S.C. 
§ 9703 fails because the Mint is an entity within the Treasury 
and was not the only agency involved here.  Section 
9703(o)(1) provides a definition for “Department of the 
Treasury law enforcement organization,” a definition which 
includes the Secret Service but excludes the Mint.  31 U.S.C. 
§ 9703(o)(1).15  A separate subsection provides that “property 
and currency shall be deemed to be forfeited pursuant to a law 
enforced or administered by a Department of the Treasury 
law enforcement organization if it is forfeited pursuant to—
. . . (B) a civil administrative forfeiture proceeding conducted 
by a Department of the Treasury law enforcement 
organization.”   Id. § 9703(m)(2)(B).  But the Secret Service 
is the agency that “seized” the Double Eagles on September 
22, 2004 and that continued to have custody of the coins until 
months later.  (J.A. 818.)  The Secret Service is authorized to 
conduct a forfeiture pursuant to § 9703.  That the Treasury 
ordered the Secret Service to give the Double Eagles to the 
Mint (J.A. 821) does not insulate the Government from 
CAFRA.  Section 9703 sought to limit various agencies’ 
ability to conduct seizures; it does not give agencies that are 
not authorized to conduct seizures a carte blanche ability to 
avoid CAFRA. 
 
Third, § 983(a)(3)(A)’s “good cause” exception does 
not excuse the Government’s failings here.  Pursuant to the 
statute, “[n]ot later than 90 days after a claim has been filed, 
the Government shall file a complaint for forfeiture . . . , 
except that a court in the district in which the complaint will 
be filed may extend the period for filing a complaint for good 
                                              
15 We note an inconsistency in the U.S. Code: there are two 
separate statutes both identified as 31 U.S.C. § 9703. 
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cause shown or upon agreement of the parties.”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 983(a)(3)(A) (emphasis added).  We cannot help but read 
this language (“shall file . . . except . . . may extend”) to mean 
that the good cause exception allows the Government to seek 
an extension of time only before the 90-day period expires.  
See United States v. Funds from Fifth Third Bank Account, 
No. 13-11728, 2013 WL 5914101, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 4, 
2013) (“Given the narrow language used [in § 983(a)(3)(A)], 
this Court concludes that the Government has to seek the 
extension before the limitations period passes and that it 
cannot seek a ‘retroactive extension.’”); see also United 
States v. One 1991 Ford Mustang LX, 909 F. Supp. 831, 834 
(D. Colo. 1996); United States v. 1986 Ford Bronco, 782 F. 
Supp. 1543, 1546 (S.D. Fla. 1992); United States v. One 
White 1987 Tempest Sport Boat, 726 F. Supp. 7, 9 (D. Mass. 
1989).  The period cannot be extended if it has already 
passed.16   
                                              
16 Congress included the “good cause” exception to “make it 
unnecessary for the government, as it often must under 
current law, to file a complaint and then immediately request 
a stay under Rule 26, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or 
under other statutory authority, to avoid jeopardizing a 
criminal case.”  H.R. Rep. No. 105-358(I), at 45 (1997) 
(footnote omitted).  Congress explained that “the court should 
grant an extension of time where the filing of the complaint, 
which is required to recite the factual basis in some detail, 
would reveal facts concerning a pending investigation, 
undercover operation, or court-authorized electronic 
surveillance, or would jeopardize government witnesses.”  Id. 
at 44 (footnote omitted).  Furthermore, “the court could grant 
the extension to allow the government to include the 
forfeiture in a criminal indictment, and thus avoid the 
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Even if the statute did permit retroactive extensions, 
the Government would not be entitled to an extension for two 
reasons.  First, the Government’s delay was not minor; the 
Government failed to file a complaint until September 28, 
2009—four years and nineteen days after the Langbords filed 
their seized asset claim—and only did so under court order.  
See United States v. $39,480.00 in U.S. Currency, 190 F. 
Supp. 2d 929, 932 & n.9 (W.D. Tex. 2002) (permitting a 
retroactive extension when the government was one day late).  
Second, according to the Government’s own documents, after 
the Secret Service seized the Double Eagles, “[a]ll the 
agencies involved, with the exception of the US Mint, [were] 
in favor of pursuing forfeiture.”  (J.A. 818.)  Thus, the 
Government knew that it was obligated to bring a judicial 
civil forfeiture proceeding or to return the property, but 
refused to do so.17  As a result, the Government cannot show 
good cause.18 
                                                                                                     
necessity of initiating parallel civil and criminal forfeitures.”  
Id.  Congress’s reasons for including the good cause 
exception are certainly not applicable here. 
17 We note that an unjustified mistake of law can hardly be 
considered “good cause.”  See Green v. Humphrey Elevator 
& Truck Co., 816 F.2d 877, 884 (3d Cir. 1987) (“We need not 
decide here, the parameters of the ‘good cause’ exception to 
Rule 4(j) for it is clear that an unjustified misunderstanding of 
the requirements of the law will not suffice.”). 
18 The Government incorrectly states that the District Court 
found good cause here.  The District Court stated no more 
than that “the Government might still have had an opportunity 
to file a judicial forfeiture action” under the good cause 
exception.  (J.A. 148 n.3 (emphasis added).)  However, it did 
not find good cause, nor could it have. 
 28 
 
Accordingly, a nonjudicial civil forfeiture proceeding 
occurred here, and the Government missed the 90-day 
deadline under § 983(a)(3).  On September 9, 2005, when the 
Langbords submitted their seized asset claim, the 90-day 
period in § 983(a)(3) commenced.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 983(a)(3)(A).  The Government failed to return the 
Langbords’ property or institute a judicial civil forfeiture 
proceeding within 90 days.  Having failed to do so, it must 
return the Double Eagles to the Langbords.19   
                                              
19 While the dissent refers to a myriad of cases purportedly 
contradicting the reasoning and the result we embrace, those 
cases are easily distinguishable, and the impact of CAFRA’s 
specific language in § 983(a)(3) could not be clearer.  The 
dissent’s argument—i.e., that the Government should have 
followed § 983(a)(3) but that its failure does not lead to the 
return of the Langbords’ property—is a novel position that 
was not urged by the Government.  Moreover, the statutes 
that are the subject of the cases cited in the dissent have little 
in common with CAFRA.  See, e.g., Dolan v. United States, 
560 U.S. 605 (2010) (Mandatory Restitution Act); Shenango 
Inc. v. Apfel, 307 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 2002) (Coal Act).  It relies 
on forfeiture cases that do not involve § 983(a)(3) at all.  See, 
e.g., Garcia v. Meza, 235 F.3d 287 (7th Cir. 2000); United 
States v. Giraldo, 45 F.3d 509 (1st Cir. 1995); Lopez v. 
United States, 863 F. Supp. 2d 127 (D. Mass. 2012); DeSaro 
v. United States, No. 06-cv-20531 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2006).  
It relies on cases that describe whether a statutory deadline is 
jurisdictional, which is relevant for situations in which the 
claimant failed to timely argue that the 90-day deadline in 
§ 983(a)(3) required the return of the property, with the 
claimant instead making the § 983(a)(3) argument in, e.g., a 
Rule 60 motion to vacate a judgment.  See, e.g., United States 
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v. Vazquez-Alvarez, 760 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam); 
United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789 (4th Cir. 2012); United 
States v. Martin, 662 F.3d 301 (4th Cir. 2011).  Here, in 
contrast, the Langbords have pressed this argument since day 
one.  See supra note 14.  And it relies on cases interpreting 
the 60-day notice deadline in § 983(a)(1).  See, e.g., United 
States v. $11,500.00 in U.S. Currency, 710 F.3d 1006 (9th 
Cir. 2013); United States v. $114,031.00 in U.S. Currency, 
No. 06-cv-21820, 2007 WL 2904154 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 2007); 
Salmo v. United States, No. 06-12909, 2006 WL 2975503 
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2006); Manjarrez v. U.S. Dep’t of the 
Treasury, No. 01-7530, 2002 WL 31870533 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 
19, 2002).  The 60-day notice deadline in § 983(a)(1) is 
fundamentally different from the 90-day deadline in 
§ 983(a)(3) because, if the Government misses § 983(a)(1)’s 
60-day deadline, CAFRA specifically allows the Government 
“to commence a forfeiture proceeding at a later time.”  18 
U.S.C. § 983(a)(1)(F).  There is no analogous provision that 
gives the Government a second chance if it misses the 90-day 
deadline in § 983(a)(3) or otherwise excuses the failure to act.  
Congress could have included such a provision, but it did not.  
As noted by Wilson—a case relied upon by the dissent—“the 
time limit imposed on the government by § 983(a)(3) is 
mandatory.”  699 F.3d at 791.  “If the Government does not 
file a complaint or take other action within 90 days as 
required, it must ‘release the property pursuant to regulations 
promulgated by the Attorney General, and may not take any 
further action to effect the civil forfeiture of such property in 
connection with the underlying offense.’”  Id. at 795 
(emphasis added) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(3)(B)).  In that 
case, Wilson lost merely because he raised his § 983(a)(3) 
argument too late, i.e., in a Rule 60 motion to vacate the 
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B.  The Declaratory Judgment 
Given this conclusion, the District Court should not 
have ordered the declaratory judgment claim to proceed, and 
indeed we must vacate the declaratory judgment.  The 
declaratory judgment entered by the District Court was the 
following: 
 
The disputed Double Eagles were not lawfully 
removed from the United States Mint and 
accordingly, as a matter of law, they remain the 
property of the United States, regardless of (1) 
the applicability of CAFRA to the disputed 
Double Eagles, (2) Claimants’ [i.e., the 
Langbords’] state of mind with respect to the 
coins, or (3) how the coins came into 
Claimants’ possession. 
 
(J.A. 52-53.)  The District Court opined that “the declaration 
concerns a different–and broader–set of legal rights than the 
narrow question decided by the jury, which was simply 
whether the Government had proven its claim of forfeiture of 
the 1933 Double Eagles.”  (J.A. 53-54.)  However, the 
District Court recognized that “the jury’s verdict [on the 
forfeiture claim] dictates the outcome of the declaratory 
judgment claim” and that it made the declaration “solely on 
the basis of facts necessarily (although implicitly) found by 
the jury.”  (J.A. 52.) 
 
                                                                                                     
judgment.  See id. at 707 (“Wilson forfeited his limitations 
argument by not raising it during the forfeiture 
proceedings.”).   
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We will vacate the declaratory judgment for two 
reasons.  First, the declaratory judgment proceeding cannot be 
recognized because, having missed CAFRA’s 90-day 
deadline, the Government cannot use a declaratory judgment 
proceeding to circumvent that deadline.  We have held that a 
“statute of limitations can[not] be circumvented merely by 
‘[d]raping [the] claim in the raiment of the Declaratory 
Judgment Act.’”  Algrant v. Evergreen Valley Nurseries Ltd. 
P’ship, 126 F.3d 178, 185 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Gilbert v. 
City of Cambridge, 932 F.2d 51, 58 (1st Cir. 1991)).  
Algrant’s focus is on whether the claims are “barred by a 
statute of limitations applicable to a concurrent legal 
remedy,” which means that the declaratory judgment is 
“essentially predicated upon the same cause of action.”  Id. at 
184-85.  Here, as the District Court acknowledged, the 
forfeiture and declaratory judgment claims are undoubtedly 
predicated upon the same cause of action, and, therefore, the 
declaratory judgment claim cannot be used to circumvent 
CAFRA’s 90-day deadline.   
 
Second, the declaratory judgment proceeding cannot 
be recognized because CAFRA amounts to a “special 
statutory proceeding.”  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 57 
states that “[t]he existence of another adequate remedy does 
not preclude a declaratory judgment that is otherwise 
appropriate.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 57.  However, the Advisory 
Committee’s Note qualifies Rule 57 by stating that a 
“declaration may not be rendered if a special statutory 
proceeding has been provided for the adjudication of some 
special type of case, but general ordinary or extraordinary 
legal remedies, whether regulated by statute or not, are not 
deemed special statutory proceedings.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 57 
advisory committee’s note.  The Supreme Court has 
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confirmed that declaratory relief “should not be granted 
where a special statutory proceeding has been provided.”  
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 296 (1964).   
 
Although no court has opined that CAFRA provides 
for a special statutory proceeding, conversely, no court has 
held that CAFRA does not provide for a special statutory 
proceeding.  We hold that it does.  To date, “a handful of 
categories of cases have been recognized as ‘special statutory 
proceedings.’”  N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160, 
166 (2d Cir. 2006).  “These include: (i) petitions for habeas 
corpus and motions to vacate criminal sentences; (ii) 
proceedings under the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and (iii) 
certain administrative proceedings.”  Id. (internal citations 
omitted).  “Each of these categories involved procedures and 
remedies specifically tailored to a limited subset of cases, 
usually one brought under a particular statute.”  Id.   
 
Here, there is no doubt that the realm of civil forfeiture 
involves “procedures and remedies specifically tailored to a 
limited subset of cases.”  See id.  CAFRA provides a 
structured scheme, which gives the parties multiple deadlines 
to follow and puts a heightened burden on the Government.  
CAFRA, like the Civil Rights Act of 1964, involves 
procedures and remedies tailored to a limited subset of cases 
and preserves individual rights.  Given this tailored scheme, 
even if the Government had filed a judicial action within 90 
days from when the Langbords filed their seized asset claim 
(and therefore we did not have the Algrant issue of the 
Government using the declaratory judgment claim to 
circumvent CAFRA’s 90-day deadline), the Government 
could not use the declaratory judgment to circumvent the 
specific remedy and heightened burden that CAFRA 
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provides.  Based on either of these alternative grounds, we 
must vacate the declaratory judgment.20  
 
C.  The Remaining Issues 
Because we will vacate the declaratory judgment, we 
do not address whether the jury should have decided that 
claim.  Furthermore, given that we will also vacate the 
judgment on the forfeiture claim, we do not address the 
multiple trial issues raised by the Langbords, nor do we 
address the mens rea required for a violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 641, nor whether forfeiture is permitted for a § 641 
violation where the theft or embezzlement of Government 
property occurred before § 641 was enacted in 1948.   
 
IV.  Conclusion 
At the insistence of the Mint and against the wisdom 
of the Secret Service and multiple other agencies, the 
Government opted to ignore CAFRA.  Now, the Langbords 
are entitled to the return of the Double Eagles.  We will 
reverse in pertinent part the District Court’s July 29, 2009 
order, which denied the Langbords’ cross-motion for partial 
summary judgment concerning the applicability of CAFRA, 
and will vacate all orders at issue on appeal that postdate the 
July 29, 2009 order,21 including the jury verdict and the 
                                              
20 Given this disposition, we do not address the Langbords’ 
remaining arguments as to why the declaratory judgment 
must be vacated. 
21 We will affirm the earlier order dated May 11, 2009, which 
denied both the Langbords’ and the Government’s motions to 
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District Court’s order entering judgment.  We will remand for 
the District Court to order the Government to return the 
Double Eagles to the Langbords. 
                                                                                                     
exclude expert witnesses. We express no opinion as to 
whether the expert testimony at trial was appropriate. 
Langbord v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury 
 
No. 12-4574 
 
Argued:  November 19, 2014 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 The members of this panel agree on certain basic 
issues:  The Government of the United States (hereafter 
“Government”) acted unconstitutionally when it seized the 
ten Golden Eagle coins that had been delivered to it on behalf 
of the Langbords for authentication and determined to retain 
those coins without proceeding to a hearing after the seizure.1  
And I agree with the District Court and the majority that the 
seizure took place when the Government sent its notice that it 
would not return the coins. 
 
 I also agree with the majority’s view that the 
Government in this case rather casually treated its obligation 
                                              
1 The Government has chosen not to rely on the 
characterization of the Golden Eagles as “contraband” and 
thus does not argue the application of 18 U.S.C. § 
983(a)(1)(F), which provides that “The Government shall not 
be required to return contraband or other property that the 
person from whom the property was seized may not legally 
possess.”  Because gold may now be possessed, we will not 
try to determine whether the Golden Eagles were contraband 
at the time McCann and Switt illegally removed them from 
the Mint. 
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under CAFRA to proceed to a hearing.  Although it acted for 
what turned out to be good reason (i.e. that because the 
Double Eagles were stolen from the Mint—a conclusion 
reached by two fact-finders after a full hearing—they were 
already Government property and there was no reason to 
subject them to forfeiture), the proper course of action was to 
institute forfeiture proceedings to allow a court to determine 
the disputed property rights.  See United States v. Barnard, 72 
F. Supp. 531, 532 (W.D. Tenn. 1947); App. at 59.  The 
District Court, who throughout this case was the Honorable 
Legrome Davis of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
agreed with the Langbords.  The Court held that the 
“appropriate and authorized remedy for the Government’s 
denial of Plaintiffs’ due process rights is a prompt forfeiture 
hearing.”  App. at 166.  It therefore effected a remedy by 
ruling:  “Accordingly we will direct the Government to 
initiate a judicial forfeiture proceeding as part of this action 
on or before Monday, September 28, 2009.”  Id.  In other 
words, the Langbords won that issue. 
 
 This, however, is where my agreement with the 
majority ends.  I definitely do not agree with the majority’s 
holding that the Langbords are now “entitled to the return of 
the Double Eagles,” Maj. Op. at 12, because the Government 
failed to institute judicial civil forfeiture proceedings “within 
90 days” of receiving the Langbords’ self-styled seized asset 
claim.  There is no provision of CAFRA that makes ultimate 
entitlement to the disputed property conditional on the 
amount of time before the Government files a forfeiture 
hearing.  Although there is language in CAFRA that requires 
the Government to return items it seized or proceed to have 
the issue of ownership decided by a forfeiture proceeding, 
this does not mean that the claimants are entitled to 
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ownership of the property at issue, although the jury has 
determined that the property belongs to the Government, 
which is the result the majority appears to reach. 
 
 The statute does not state or suggest that the return is 
unconditional.  In fact, the provision on which the majority 
relies, § 983(a)(3) provides “return the property” “pending the 
filing of a complaint . . . .”  Neither the legislative history nor 
the majority explains the meaning of the “pending” condition. 
 
 The majority also asserts that CAFRA (through 
incorporation of another provision) requires that notice of a 
seizure must be given within 60 days of a seizure, which it 
argues at length is required in some but not all cases.  I do not 
agree.  I believe notice is required in all cases and the 
Constitution and the relevant statutes so require. 
 
 Finally, the majority vacates the District Court’s award 
of declaratory judgment on a basis no court has accepted, and 
with which I cannot agree. 
 
I 
 
 The majority’s position that the Government has lost 
its entitlement to its own property because it failed to follow 
the strict requirement of CAFRA as to the time to file a 
forfeiture suit has been rejected in principle by numerous 
courts, among them the Supreme Court of the United States, 
other courts of appeals, and many district courts.  Those 
courts have held that the Government’s failure to strictly 
adhere to a statutory timeframe does not deprive the 
Government of the chance to pursue the action contemplated 
by the statute. 
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 In United States v. $8,850 in U.S. Currency, 461 U.S. 
555, 558 (1983), the Supreme Court had before it a similar 
statute providing for forfeiture (in that case, of currency), 
which required the United States Attorney “if it appears 
probable that a forfeiture has been incurred” to “cause the 
proper proceedings to be commenced and prosecuted without 
delay.”  Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1604).  The Court, through 
Justice O’Connor writing for eight Justices, rejected the 
claimant’s argument that the Government’s “dilatory” 
commencement of civil forfeiture violated the claimant’s 
right to due process.  Id. at 561.  Justice O’Connor noted that 
“The Government must be allowed some time to decide 
whether to institute forfeiture proceedings.”  Id. at 565.  She 
further commented that the issue of “the length of time 
between the seizure [of the item at issue] and the initiation of 
the forfeiture trial—mirrors the concern of undue delay 
encompassed in the right to a speedy trial” analyzed in Barker 
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), where the Court enunciated a 
balancing test.  461 U.S. at 564.  After considering the 
relevant factors, the Court stated that although the 
Government’s 18-month delay instituting civil forfeiture 
proceedings was “substantial,” it was reasonable and the 
claimant had not asserted or shown that the delay prejudiced 
her ability to defend against the forfeiture.  Id. at 569-70.  
The Court reversed the holding of the court of appeals 
dismissing the forfeiture action and remanded for forfeiture 
proceedings.  Id. at 570. 
 
 That case was decided before the enactment of 
CAFRA, but similar reasoning has been applied by other 
courts dealing with forfeiture under CAFRA or statutes with 
similar provisions.  One such example can be found in United 
States v. Vazquez-Alvarez, 760 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2014).  
5 
 
Claimant Vazquez interposed two grounds to defeat the 
Government’s forfeiture of currency he had carried into the 
country:  one, irrelevant here, was that the Government did 
not execute its warrant against the cash.  Id. at 195.  The 
second, most relevant here, was that the Government failed to 
bring its forfeiture action within the time set by the statute.  
Id.  Both, he argued, stripped the district court of its 
jurisdiction over the res.  Id.  The Second Circuit, in a per 
curiam opinion, stated, “We disagree.  The statutory time 
limits for commencing a forfeiture action are claims-
processing rules, not jurisdictional rules.”  Id.  Ultimately 
dismissing Vazquez for lack of standing, the court rejected 
the claimant’s allegation that he should prevail because the 
Government filed its civil forfeiture action “well after the 60-
day time period allotted by 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(1)(A)(ii).”  Id. 
at 198.  It stated, “assuming without deciding that the 
[G]overnment filed late, a late-filed forfeiture action would 
not deprive the district court of subject matter jurisdiction.”  
Id.   
 
 The Vazquez-Alvarez court relied in part on a Fourth 
Circuit decision, United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789 (4th 
Cir. 2012).  In Wilson, the claimant sought to set aside a 
forfeiture judgment as void because the Government had 
filed its forfeiture complaint later than § 983(a)(3)’s 90-day 
time limit.  699 F.3d at 791.  The claimant had not raised the 
timing objection during the forfeiture proceeding, but argued 
that “the time limit was jurisdictional and therefore was not 
forfeited by his failure to raise it.”  Id.  The Fourth Circuit 
rejected the claimant’s argument, stating, “While the time 
limit imposed on the [G]overnment by § 983(a)(3) is 
mandatory, it is not jurisdictional.”  Id.  In reaching this 
conclusion, the court noted,  
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it readily appears that the 
provisions of § 983 are procedural 
rules for pursuing the forfeiture of 
seized assets.  The subject matter 
jurisdiction for forfeiture is 
conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1355(a); 
the authority to forfeit is provided 
by 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6); and the 
rules of procedure for pursuing a 
civil forfeiture are provided by 18 
U.S.C. § 983. 
Id. at 795.  The court further noted that § 983(a)(3)(A) allows 
courts to “extend the period for filing a complaint for good 
cause shown or upon the agreement of the parties,” and stated 
that the possibility of an extension of time “undercuts any 
argument that the deadline is jurisdictional.  Congress does 
not typically allow an agreement of the parties to define the 
scope of the district court’s authority to hear a case.”  Id.  
Thus, the court concluded that “the provisions of § 983 are 
procedural rules for pursuing the forfeiture of seized assets,” 
not “conditions of subject matter jurisdiction.”  Id. 
 
 The Wilson court relied on the decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605 
(2010), where Justice Breyer, speaking for the Court, 
analyzed in detail the effect to be given different statutory 
“deadlines.”  699 F.3d at 793.  The statute under 
consideration in Dolan (the Mandatory Victims Restitution 
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3664) provided that in sentencing “the court 
shall set a date for the final determination of the victim’s 
losses, not to exceed 90 days after sentencing.”  The 90-day 
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deadline passed, and the Supreme Court undertook to 
consider the consequences of the missed deadline where the 
statute does not specify the particular consequences.  In 
answering that question, Justice Breyer noted that the Court 
has looked to statutory language, the relevant context, and “to 
what they reveal about the purposes that a time limit is 
designed to serve.”  560 U.S. at 610.  He considered first two 
possibilities:  whether the 90-day deadline in the case before 
the Court had a jurisdictional purpose or whether it was an 
ordinary claim-processing rule.  After rejecting those 
possibilities, he concluded that there was a third possibility 
which he held was applicable:  “a time-related directive that 
is legally enforceable but does not deprive a judge or other 
public official of the power to take the action to which the 
deadline applies if the deadline is missed.”  Id. at 611 
(emphasis added). 
 
 The analysis applied by Justice Breyer in Dolan 
requires rejection of the majority’s position that the 
Government’s failure to file a civil forfeiture action within 90 
days of the Langbords’ filing of a seized asset claim requires 
return of the Golden Eagles to the Langbords.  The first factor 
to which Justice Breyer looked was the statutory language.  
He noted that the use of the word “shall” in the statute’s time-
related directive has not, alone, “always led this Court to 
interpret statutes to bar judges (or other officials) from taking 
the action to which a missed statutory deadline refers.”  Id. 
(emphasis added).  Similarly, the use of the word “shall” in 
§ 983(a)(3)(A) (“Not later than 90 days after a claim has been 
filed, the Government shall file a complaint for forfeiture . . . 
. ” (emphasis added)) is not dispositive here.  As Justice 
Breyer explained, the statute’s “main substantive objectives” 
control.  Id. at 613.  In Dolan, the statute at issue was meant 
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to “help victims of a crime secure prompt restitution rather 
than to provide defendants with certainty as to the amount of 
their liability.”  Id.  Applying similar reasoning, we see that 
CAFRA’s purpose is not to deprive the Government of its 
property, but rather to determine the rightful owner of the 
property.  As stated in the House Report introducing CAFRA,  
 
H.R. 1965 [CAFRA] is designed 
to make federal civil forfeiture 
procedures fair for property 
owners—to give innocent 
property owners the means to 
recover their property and make 
themselves whole.  H.R. 1965 is 
not designed to emasculate federal 
civil forfeiture efforts.  To the 
contrary, by making civil 
forfeiture fairer, this Committee is 
prepared to (and H.R. 1965 does) 
expand the reach of civil 
forfeiture and make it an even 
stronger law enforcement tool. 
 
H.R. Rep. No. 105-358(I), at 27 (1997).  Therefore, as in 
Dolan, I disagree with reading the word “shall” in the statute 
to deprive the Government of the opportunity to pursue its 
property claim.  
 
 The effect of a missed statutory deadline does not 
require the Government to lose its opportunity to provide the 
proceedings that were missed, as noted in cases from the 
Supreme Court, the other courts of appeals and the district 
courts.  As explained in its comprehensive analysis, the 
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Fourth Circuit classified the 90-day “deadline” in another 
forfeiture statute as a “time-related directive,” one even more 
forgiving than a “claims processing rule.”  United States v. 
Martin, 662 F.3d 301, 308 (4th Cir. 2011).  The majority 
continually stresses that CAFRA “requires” the Government 
to file a civil forfeiture action.  Here again, the Dolan opinion 
and its progeny show that the majority is wrong.   
 
 In Dolan, the Court was concerned about the possible 
harm to the victim from the missed deadline.  In this case, the 
majority hypothesizes no harm to the Langbords.  Although 
the majority does not point us to a single way in which the 
Langbords were harmed, it argues that they were prejudiced 
by the Government’s “undue delay.”  The District Court 
addressed the issue of delay in the context of the Langbords’ 
objection to the Government’s filing of its declaratory 
judgment claim.  Judge Davis denied the Langbords’ 
objection, stating, “Permitting the United States to now bring 
its desired . . . declaratory judgment count[] neither 
introduces new factual issues nor revives irrelevant disputes.  
In short, [the Langbords] will occupy no worse a position 
than had the Government brought this counterclaim when 
answering the 2006 complaint.”  App. at 125-26.  I agree. 
 
 The majority also presses its case against the 
Government for its alleged failure to comply with § 983 
requiring notice of its seizure within 60 days.  I note that the 
Langbords were aware from the very beginning of the matter 
of the Government’s position as to the Golden Eagles.  
Shortly after the Langbords’ counsel presented the coins to 
the Mint for authentication and sought $40 million for them 
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from the Government, App. 1442, the Government’s counsel 
sent him a written memorandum advising that the coins were 
government property and “that the U. S. Mint has no intention 
of seeking forfeiture of [them].”  App. at 143-44.  Thus, the 
Langbords were on notice of the Government’s chosen course 
of action well within the statute’s 60-day notice requirement, 
and therefore suffered no prejudice from lack of notice. 
 
 In Dolan, the Court stated that the party normally can 
mitigate any harm that a missed deadline might cause by 
simply telling the court or setting a timely hearing, which is 
what happened in this case.  See 560 U.S. at 615-16.  When 
the Langbords raised the absence of a hearing Judge Davis 
ordered one.  There are numerous cases, including those in 
the Supreme Court, the other circuits, and the district courts, 
that applied the same approach.  Id. at 611 (finding a court’s 
violation of the statutory timeframe to sentence a defendant to 
be a mere “time-related directive” that is legally enforceable 
but ultimately does not deprive the court of power to 
determine the substantive issue); Barnhart v. Peabody Coal 
Co., 537 U.S. 149, 171-172 (2003) (missed deadline for 
assigning industry retiree benefits does not prevent later 
award of benefits); Regions Hosp. v. Shalala, 522 U.S. 448, 
459 n.3 (1998) (even though Government missed the statutory 
deadline to file a report with Congress by approximately five 
years, the “failure to meet the deadline . . . . does not mean 
that [the] official lacked power to act beyond it”); United 
States v. Montalvo–Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 722 (1990) 
(missed statutory deadline for holding bail detention hearing 
does not require judge to release defendant); Brock v. Pierce 
                                              
2  Later, the Langbords lowered their claim to $7 or $8 
million.   
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Cnty., 476 U.S. 253, 266 (1986) (missed statutory deadline 
for making final determination as to misuse of federal grant 
funds does not prevent later recovery of funds); United States 
v. Williams, 720 F.3d 674, 702 (8th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 
134 S. Ct. 1337 (2014) (failing to follow criminal forfeiture 
procedures at trial does not relinquish the district court’s 
ability to order post-conviction forfeiture); Martin, 662 F.3d 
at 308-09 (deadline for the district court to enter a criminal 
forfeiture order is a “time-related directive” and thus missing 
the deadline did not strip district court of the power to enter 
forfeiture orders); Cyberworld Enter. Techs., Inc. v. 
Napolitano, 602 F.3d 189, 198 (3d Cir. 2010) (Government 
was not precluded from taking action when it imposed 
sanctions on an employer eighteen months after the statutory 
limitations period expired); Shenango Inc. v. Apfel, 307 F.3d 
174, 196-97 (3d Cir. 2002) (affirming that Government could 
assign benefits to employees under the Coal Act even after 
end of the statutory deadline for such assignment because the 
statutory timeframe was not meant to strip the Government of 
power to act beyond the deadline); Sw. Pa. Growth Alliance 
v. Browner, 121 F.3d 106, 113–115 (3d Cir. 1997) (denying 
petition to review the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
ruling even though the ruling occurred outside the statutory 
timeframe because the statutory timeframe does not divest the 
agency of jurisdiction to act); Marshall Durbin Food Corp. v. 
Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 959 F.2d 915, 919 (11th Cir. 
1992) (Interstate Commerce Commission’s (“ICC”) failure to 
review Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) preliminary 
decision within mandatory review period did not divest ICC 
of authority to reverse ALJ decision); Lowell Consortium v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 893 F.2d 432, 433 n.3 (1st Cir. 1990) 
(allowing agency to recover funds almost five years after 120-
day mandatory period had expired); City of Camden v. U.S. 
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Dep’t of Labor, 831 F.2d 449, 451 (3d Cir. 1987) (allowing 
agency to recover funds six years after 120-day mandatory 
period had expired); St. Regis Mohawk Tribe, N.Y. v. Brock, 
769 F.2d 37, 46 (2d Cir. 1985) (Government’s failure to 
comply with the 120-day time limit for directing repayment 
of misspent federal grant funds did not bar Government from 
making the determination as it would “sacrifice[e] the public 
interest because of the negligence of public officers”); Balt. & 
Ohio Chi. Terminal R.R. v. United States, 583 F.2d 678, 690 
(3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 968 (1979) (because the 
Interstate Commerce Act “contains no express sanction for 
noncompliance” with the statutory deadline, belated agency 
proceedings need not be dismissed); Usery v. Whitin Mach. 
Works, Inc., 554 F.2d 498, 501 (1st Cir. 1977) (under the 
Trade Act of 1974, the Government may determine an 
employee’s eligibility for economic assistance even if the 
determination is outside the 60-day statutory limit).   
 
 The majority disparages my dissent’s use of what it 
calls “easily distinguishable cases” that do not involve § 
983(a)(3).  See Maj. Op. at 28 n.19.  The numerous cases 
cited in the dissent are hardly “easily distinguishable.”  They 
involve forfeiture, as does CAFRA.  It was my understanding 
that appellate opinions frequently apply reasoning from 
similar, albeit different statutes, to make a point.  The 
majority apparently requires one-on-one identity with the 
statute under consideration.  The majority apparently feels 
free to censure a mere colleague’s use of analogous 
precedent, but it apparently doesn’t notice or recognize 
application of the same approach by a member of the 
Supreme Court of the United States.  For example, Justice 
Breyer, in Dolan, uses as precedent for the Court’s analysis of 
the Mandatory Restitution Act what the majority would 
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regards as “easily distinguishable” statutes.  See Dolan, 360 
U.S at 612 (citing Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. at 718-19 
(interpreting Bail Reform Act of 1984); Brock, 476 U.S. at 
262 (interpreting Comprehensive Employment Training Act); 
Barnhart, 537 U.S. at 158-63 (interpreting Coal Industry 
Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992); Regions Hosp., 522 U.S. 
at 459 n.3 (interpreting Medicare Act)). 
 
 It stands to reason, then, that the proper remedy for a 
failure to follow CAFRA’s notice or filing timeframes is to 
order the Government to comply with the statute, and many 
courts have so held.  For example, in DeSaro v. United States, 
No. 06-cv-20531 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2006), after the 11th 
Circuit had remanded the individual’s CAFRA claim against 
the Government for its seizure and four year retention of two 
oil paintings without filing a forfeiture suit and without 
providing the required 60 day notice in criminal actions, the 
district court held that because the ownership and 
forfeitability of the paintings had been the subject of litigation 
almost since they were seized, the “requirement to bring a 
timely forfeiture action is therefore tolled.”  Id.; see also 
Garcia v. Meza, 235 F.3d 287, 292 (7th Cir. 2000) (ordering 
Government to either return the property or institute judicial 
forfeiture proceedings after Government’s original attempt at 
notice was deemed not to have afforded due process); United 
States v. Giraldo, 45 F.3d 509, 512 (1st Cir. 1995) (“If the 
notice turns out to have been [constitutionally] inadequate, 
the forfeiture is void.  The district court then must set aside 
the declaration of forfeiture and order the Customs Service to 
return the money to Giraldo or begin judicial forfeiture 
proceedings in the district court.”); Lopez v. United States, 
863 F. Supp. 2d 127, 130 (D. Mass. 2012) (“When a district 
court concludes that procedural deficiencies render an 
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administrative forfeiture void, it must order the agency to 
return the seized property or begin judicial forfeiture 
proceedings.”); United States v. $114,143.00 in U.S. 
Currency Seized from Michael J. Callash’s Vehicle, 609 F. 
Supp. 2d 1321, 1322-23 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (ordering 
Government to file a forfeiture complaint after the Drug 
Enforcement Administration improperly rejected a seized 
asset claim, where the claimant was aware within the notice 
period that Government had commenced administrative 
forfeiture proceedings, and noting that “the interests of justice 
are best served here . . . by allowing the parties to resolve [the 
forfeiture claim] on the merits” (alterations in original; 
internal citations omitted)). 
 
 The majority focuses exclusively on the “return of the 
Golden Eagles.”  It does not challenge the District Court’s 
decision that the Government’s institution of a civil forfeiture 
proceeding would be an adequate remedy.  In so ruling, the 
District Court stated that “[the Langbords] concede that return 
is not required if the Government promptly initiates a judicial 
forfeiture proceeding.”  App. at 157 (citing Plaintiffs’ Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Due Process & Illegal Seizure).  The 
Court continued, “it is well established that ‘illegal seizure of 
property does not immunize it from forfeiture as long as the 
[G]overnment can sustain the forfeiture claim with 
independent evidence.’”  Id. (citing United States v. Pierre, 
484 F.3d 75, 87 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. 47 West 644 
Route 38, 190 F.3d 781, 782 (7th Cir. 1999)).  The majority 
never explains why the ten day forfeiture trial presided over 
by Judge Davis, “at which time the [Langbords could] raise 
whatever defenses [were] available to them,” did not provide 
an adequate remedy.  App. at 165 (citing United States v. Von 
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Neumann, 474 U.S. 242, 251 (1983); Garcia v. Meza, 235 
F.3d 287, 292 (7th Cir. 2000); Giraldo, 45 F.3d at 512). 
 
 As to the adequacy of the remedy ordered I note the 
Ninth Circuit’s comments in United States v. $11,500.00 in 
U.S. Currency, 710 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013), another 
CAFRA case where the Government was directed to send 
notice after missing the statutory deadline.  The court asked, 
“is the [G]overnment required to return the property even if it 
has in the meantime commenced forfeiture proceedings?”  Id. 
at 1016.  In that case, by the time the issue was raised before 
the district court, the forfeiture proceeding was underway.  
The Ninth Circuit responded to its own question:  “requiring 
the return of the property and then permitting the 
[G]overnment to immediately re-seize it would impose a 
meaningless exercise.”  Id.; see also United States v. 
$114,031.00 in U.S. Currency, No. 06-CIV-21820, 2007 WL 
2904154, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 2007); Salmo v. United 
States, No. 06-12909, 2006 WL 2975503, at *3 (E.D. Mich. 
Oct. 17, 2006); Manjarrez v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Nos. 
01 C 7530 & 01 C 9495, 2002 WL 31870533, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 
Dec. 19, 2002).     
 
 That leads to one of my principal bases for diverging 
from the majority:  it does not acknowledge that a forfeiture 
proceeding did in fact take place and simply omits to mention 
the result of that proceeding.  It is indeed baffling that the 
majority, which fervently asserts that a forfeiture proceeding 
should have taken place earlier (precise date never listed), 
disregards the result of the forfeiture proceeding when it did 
take place.  After a ten-day trial before Judge Davis, the jury 
found “in favor of the United States on Count [I] 
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(forfeiture)”—a verdict the District Court found was fully 
supported by the evidence.  App. at 59.   
 
 In its post-trial findings, the District Court laid out the 
substantial evidence the Government presented at trial in 
support of its case.  The District Court reviewed the 
Government’s evidence of the movements of all 445,500 
1933 Double Eagles that were minted as presented through its 
expert, David Tripp’s, testimony about the Mint’s 
“meticulous,” “exquisitely detailed” records.  App. at 9-11.  
The Court noted that “Tripp accounted for each and every one 
of the 445,500 1933 Double Eagles, and showed that not a 
single ’33 Double Eagle was issued to the public.”  App. at 
12.  The Court noted that the “first ‘bank holiday’ forbidding 
the payout of gold coins took effect on March 6[, 1933],  nine 
(9) days before the first shipment of ’33 Double Eagles to the 
Philadelphia Mint cashier.”  Id.  On June 27, 1933, 445,000 
of the coins were sealed in a basement vault at the Mint.  Id.  
“The remaining 500 coins were in the cashier’s control at one 
point or another.”  Id.  After 29 coins were destroyed and 437 
were returned to the Mint’s basement vaults, the cashier was 
left with 34 coins.  Id.  The records reflect that all 34 coins 
that remained with the cashier “were moved to a basement 
vault on February 2, 1934.”  Id. at 12-13.  The Mint sent two 
coins to the Smithsonian in October of 1934.  Id. at 13. 
 
[T]he Mints were authorized to 
begin melting their general stock 
of gold coins as of August 4, 
1934.  That included, of course, 
the ’33 Double Eagles held in the 
Philadelphia Mint’s vault.  The 
Mints started melting gold shortly 
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thereafter, and the entire process 
took about two-and-a-half years to 
complete.  Because Tripp could 
account for all of the ’33 Double 
Eagles and none were ever 
authorized for release, Tripp 
concluded that no ’33 Double 
Eagles—including the coins in 
this case—could have been 
obtained through legitimate 
means. 
 
Id. at 13-14. 
 
 The District Court found, relying on Tripp’s testimony, 
that “[t]he jury saw no record of a legitimate ’33 Double 
Eagle release, and from this lack of documentation one may 
reasonably infer that the responsible party appropriated the 
coins in secret, knowing full well the wrongfulness and 
illegality of his actions.”  App. at 35.  Furthermore, despite 
Switt’s own testimony, in earlier proceedings, that he never 
obtained any gold coin from the Philadelphia Mint, Switt and 
McCann’s3 bank accounts evidence thousands of dollars of 
deposits to McCann’s bank accounts that emanated from an 
account Switt controlled.  And, “the Secret Service 
determined that McCann was the likely inside source of the 
’33 Double Eagles; as Mint cashier, McCann had the 
opportunity to abscond with the coins, and McCann’s 
conviction for stealing other coins from the Mint shows that 
                                              
3 Recall that Switt was the source of the Langbords’ coins and 
McCann was the cashier at the Philadelphia U.S. Mint during 
the relevant period.  
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he knew how to pull it off.”  App. at 36.  After a lengthy 
investigation, the Secret Service could not identify any 1933 
Double Eagle that left the Mint other than coins traced to the 
possession of Israel Switt. 
 
 As to the Langbords’ knowledge, the Government 
presented evidence that in 2002, after reading a New York 
Times article about the Fenton 1933 Double Eagle (which 
mentioned Switt), Roy Langbord called Joan Langbord to ask 
if Switt (his grandfather) had kept any more of the coins.  
Joan Langbord admitted to looking into the safe deposit box 
that contained the Double Eagles many times over the years, 
including the day before the Fenton coin was auctioned, but 
maintained that she knew nothing about the coins until she 
discovered them at the bottom of the same safe deposit box in 
2003.  As the District Court noted,  
 
the evidence supports an inference 
that Joan Langbord knew her 
father had stolen the coins and 
hidden them in the family’s safe 
deposit box; she found the coins 
well before the Fenton ’33 Double 
Eagle went up for auction and 
continued to conceal them; her 
son Roy also knew of the 
questionable provenance of [the] 
1933 Double Eagles, at least after 
reading the New York Times 
piece in 2002; and the Langbords 
decided to reveal the coins to the 
Government only after learning of 
their immense monetary value, 
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hoping to cash-in like Stephen 
Fenton did. 
 
Id. at 37.  Thus, substantial evidence supports the jury’s 
verdict and the District Court’s declaratory judgment that the 
coins left the Mint illegally, that Switt was involved, that his 
relatives knew that the coins’ acquisition was illegal and 
continued to conceal them, and thus, that the coins should be 
forfeited.  None of the evidence discussed above relies upon 
the Secret Service reports, the admissibility of which, as the 
majority references, was contested on appeal on hearsay 
grounds4. 
 
 On Count II (declaratory judgment), the District Court 
declared: 
 
The disputed Double Eagles were 
not lawfully removed from the 
United States Mint and 
accordingly, as a matter of law, 
they remain the property of the 
United States, regardless of (1) 
the applicability of CAFRA to 
the disputed Double Eagles, (2) 
Claimants’ state of mind with 
respect to the coins, or (3) how 
                                              
4 The majority states that it does not reach the hearsay-within-
hearsay rule, see Maj. Op. at 10 n.5, but it then proceeds to 
reach it.  I will not reach that issue because, as set forth in the 
text, there is ample evidence to support the jury’s verdict 
without relying on the Secret Service reports. 
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the coins came into the 
Claimants’ possession. 
 
App. at 5. 
 
 Though the majority’s entire objection to the 
Government’s position in this case stems from the 
Government’s failure to file a forfeiture suit, and its failure to 
do so within the 90-day period that CAFRA fixes for that 
action, the majority gives no credit to the result of the 
judgment. 
 Finally, I believe Congress would be incredulous if 
this court were to hold that the Langbords should be given the 
Golden Eagles for which they originally sought $40 million 
because a federal lawyer did not file a forfeiture complaint 
within 90 days of the applicants filing a seized asset claim, 
notwithstanding the decision of two triers of fact that the 
Golden Eagles at issue belonged to the United States. 
 
II 
 
 The majority rejects the Government’s position (and 
the District Court’s conclusion) that the Government never 
instituted administrative forfeiture proceedings in this case 
because it never sent notice of its intent to forfeit the coins.  
The majority reasons, in part, that notice cannot possibly be 
the triggering event for CAFRA’s timeframes because, it 
believes, the forfeiture statutes require notice in “some, but 
not all, nonjudicial civil forfeiture proceedings.”  Maj. Op. at 
17-18.  I cannot agree with this reading of the forfeiture 
statutes.  Section 1607 merely exempts “vessel[s], vehicle[s], 
aircraft, [and] merchandise” worth over $500,000 from the 
administrative forfeiture process altogether, meaning that for 
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such objects, the Government would have to resort to judicial 
forfeiture.  See Stefan D. Cassella, Asset Forfeiture Law in 
the United States 154-55 (2d ed. 2013).  Objects not covered 
by § 1607 are addressed in a later statutory section:   
 
If any vessel, vehicle, aircraft, 
merchandise, or baggage is not 
subject to section 1607 of this 
title, the appropriate customs 
officer shall transmit a report of 
the case, with the names of 
available witnesses, to the United 
States attorney for the district in 
which the seizure was made for 
the institution of the proper 
proceedings for the condemnation 
of such property. 
 
19 U.S.C. § 1610.  Thus, rather than sending notice to 
interested parties as for an administrative forfeiture, seized 
property not subject to § 1607 is referred to the U.S. Attorney 
for judicial forfeiture proceedings.  See Malladi Drugs & 
Pharm., Ltd. v. Tandy, 552 F.3d 855, 887 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(“Under the customs laws, the DEA may forfeit seized goods 
valued at more than $500,000 only upon a judicial decree 
after judicial forfeiture proceedings, 19 U.S.C. § 1610, but 
may administratively forfeit goods valued at or less than 
$500,000.”).   The reason for this is that “forfeitures involving 
more valuable property must be processed through the 
judicial system.”  135 Cong. Rec., S12622-01 (daily ed. Oct. 
4, 1989) (Statement of Sen. Joseph Biden).  However, as the 
majority recognizes, the Double Eagles are monetary 
instruments which do not fall under the $500,000 threshold of 
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§ 1607(a)(1) and for which administrative forfeiture is 
allowed.  See 19 U.S.C. § 1607(a)(4). 
 
 Furthermore, the majority’s contention that § 983(e)(1) 
(“[a]ny person entitled to written notice in any nonjudicial 
civil forfeiture proceeding under a civil forfeiture statute who 
does not receive such notice may file a motion to set aside a 
declaration of forfeiture with respect to that person’s interest 
in the property”) contemplates administrative forfeitures 
beginning without notice being sent, see Maj. Op. at 20-21, 
disregards the fact that the Government often seizes property 
and does not know all of the parties that may have an interest 
in the property.  The notice provision requires the 
Government both to send notice “to each party who appears 
to have an interest in the seized article” and to publish notice 
in the newspaper for this very reason.  19 U.S.C. § 1607(a).  
Cassella explains that the Government must generally send 
notice to “the person from whom the property was seized, the 
titled owner of the property, lienholders, and any other person 
known to the Government to have an interest.”  Cassella, 
supra, at 175.  Section 983 specifically provides for situations 
in which “the identity or interest of a party is not determined 
until after the seizure or turnover but is determined before a 
declaration of forfeiture.”  18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(1)(A)(v).  
Thus, I read § 983(e)’s discussion of a party “who does not 
receive such notice” to contemplate instances in which a 
person has an interest in seized property, but to whom the 
Government does not send notice because it does not know 
that person’s identity—not because it has no obligation to 
contact that person.  Indeed, § 983(e) allows such persons to 
set aside forfeiture where “(A) the Government knew, or 
reasonably should have known, of the moving party’s interest 
and failed to take reasonable steps to provide such party with 
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notice; and (B) the moving party did not know or have reason 
to know of the seizure within sufficient time to file a timely 
claim.”  Id. § 983(e).  Far from evidencing that an 
administrative forfeiture proceeding begins before notice is 
given, § 983(e) reinforces the notion that notice is required to 
institute administrative forfeiture. 
 
III 
 
 The majority questions whether the District Court had 
the authority to issue a declaratory judgment in a CAFRA 
case.   Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, “any court of the 
United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may 
declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested 
party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is 
or could be sought.”  28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).  Rule 57 provides, 
“The existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude 
a declaratory judgment.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 57.  The District 
Court entered declaratory judgment for the Government, 
ruling that the “Double Eagles were not lawfully removed 
from the United States Mint and accordingly, as a matter of 
law, they remain the property of the United States . . . . ”  
App. at 5.   
 
 The majority vacates the declaratory judgment on a 
basis no court has accepted.   
 
 The Advisory Committee notes to Rule 57 state, “A 
declaration may not be rendered if a special statutory 
proceeding has been provided for the adjudication of some 
special type of case, but general ordinary or extraordinary 
legal remedies, whether regulated by statute or not, are not 
deemed special statutory proceedings.”  Id. (1937 Advisory 
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Committee notes); see also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 
294, 296 (1964) (declaratory relief “should not be granted 
where a special statutory proceeding has been provided”).  
The majority holds that CAFRA is a “special statutory 
proceeding” under Rule 57. 
 
However, since the enactment of 
the Declaratory Judgment Act, 
only a handful of categories of 
cases have been recognized as 
“special statutory proceedings” 
for purposes of the Advisory 
Committee’s Note.  These 
include:  (i) petitions for habeas 
corpus and motions to vacate 
criminal sentences; (ii) 
proceedings under the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964; and (iii) 
certain administrative 
proceedings. 
 
N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160, 166 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(internal citations omitted).  The parties do not direct us to, 
nor could I find, any case finding forfeiture statutes to 
preclude declaratory judgment, and the majority’s interest in 
being the first court to so hold is questionable. 
 
 In support of its argument that CAFRA fits as a 
“special statutory proceeding,” the majority, noting the 
inclusion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 within that rare 
group of statutes that have been held to fit within that 
category, compares CAFRA with the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.   Maj. Op. at 32.  That such a comparison could be 
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issued in an opinion of the Third Circuit which has a 
distinguished history in support of civil rights, whatever the 
context, shocks my conscience.  I can attribute it only to the 
desperation of its position. 
 
 Moreover, as the District Court noted, even where a 
statute provides for “special statutory proceedings” that 
would normally preclude declaratory judgment, a declaratory 
remedy may still be necessary.  See App. at 64.  The District 
Court reasoned, “even if CAFRA did typically provide a 
special statutory remedy, it does not do so in this case.”  Id.  
The Court considered the Government to be playing a dual 
role in this action:  as a representative of the people of the 
United States seeking forfeiture of the proceeds of an alleged 
crime, and as the property owner seeking to reestablish legal 
title to the coins.  CAFRA’s remedies could accomplish the 
forfeiture, but could not establish the property interest the 
Government sought to vindicate.  Therefore, the Court 
determined that the Government could pursue declaratory 
relief.  The numerous district courts throughout the county 
who hear CAFRA cases will be surprised to read that the 
Third Circuit has deprived them of a tool they have used as a 
matter of course.  Why?  Is the majority so eager to go down 
in history as the first court to scuttle a useful procedure? 
 
 In responding to the Government’s requested 
declaration that the disputed Double Eagles were not lawfully 
removed from the United States Mint and accordingly remain 
the property of the United States, the Langbords argued that 
the declaration “would impermissibly interfere with the 
province or the jury.”  App. at 57.  The District Court noted, 
“Since the Government won on the forfeiture claim, the jury 
must have found the coins were ‘not lawfully removed’ from 
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the Mint.”  Id.  It then noted, “The principle of jury 
supremacy binds us to that finding.”  Id. (citing Roebuck v. 
Drexel Univ., 852 F.2d 715, 717 (3d Cir. 1988)).  That 
principle also binds my colleagues as it did the District Judge, 
who also stated it made it “unnecessary [for the District 
Court] to conduct any additional fact finding to resolve the 
Government’s declaratory judgment claim.”  Id. 
 
IV 
 
 A careful review of the provisions of CAFRA, its 
legislative history, and the cases that have interpreted it 
reveals that the purpose of the statute, its notices, and its 
detailed  
procedures, is to allow those claiming an interest in 
potentially forfeitable property to have the merits of their case 
heard by a fact finder, who will reach a fair determination as 
to which party among those who lay claim on the subject in 
dispute is entitled to the subject.  It is that ultimate issue that 
counts, which party is entitled to the property, even if the time 
taken to reach that decision has been significant.  This case 
presented several difficult and complex issues for the District 
Court to resolve.  In a series of particularly well-reasoned 
opinions, the District Court handled these issues thoroughly 
and thoughtfully, and I would affirm.  I believe the majority 
misreads the statute, the relevant precedent, and Congress’ 
intent. 
